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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITS OF
FACIAL RECOGNITION AT THE BORDER
EMMANUEL ABRAHAM PEREA JIMENEZ†
ABSTRACT
On any given day, hundreds of thousands of people enter the United
States through ports of entry along the Mexican and Canadian borders.
At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
seizes millions of dollars’ worth of contraband entering the United
States annually. Under the border-search exception, border officials
can perform routine, warrantless searches for this contraband, based
on no suspicion of a crime, without violating the Fourth Amendment.
But as DHS integrates modern technology into its enforcement efforts,
the question becomes how these tools fit into the border-search
doctrine. Facial recognition technology (“FRT”) is a prime example.
To date, no court—and few legal scholars—have addressed how the
Fourth Amendment would regulate the use of FRT at the border. This
Note begins to fill that gap.
This Note contends that, after Carpenter v. United States, the
Fourth Amendment places at least some limits on the use of FRT at the
border. Given the absence of caselaw, this Note uses a hypothetical
border search to make three core claims. First—distinguishing between
face verification and face identification—this Note argues that face
identification constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search” only when the
images displayed to a border official reveal “the privacies of life.”
Second, because of its invasive nature, this form of face identification
is a nonroutine border search and is unconstitutional when conducted
without reasonable suspicion. Lastly, this Note concludes that a border
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official’s reasonable suspicion must be linked to a crime that bears
some nexus to the purposes underlying the border-search exception.

INTRODUCTION
At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, nearly one hundred thousand
people cross the border into San Diego, California, on any given day.1
Most will pass through primary inspection quickly and enter the United
States without incident.2 Some are referred to secondary inspection
and remain at the border until a U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”)3 officer allows them to enter the country.4 Regardless of how
long they remain at the border, those travelers are being monitored.
CBP’s many surveillance towers, drones, and motion sensors are likely
tracking their movements.5 Devices known as “IMSI catchers” may be
actively gathering their cell-site location information (“CSLI”) and
may even be collecting their text and voice messages too.6
In addition to these surveillance methods, facial recognition
technology7 (“FRT”) is an emerging technology that will, once fully
implemented, allow CBP to identify each traveler passing through San
1. San Ysidro Land Port of Entry Fact Sheet, GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/
cdnstatic/Overarching%20San%20Ysidro%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Dec%2011%202019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2N9-7UGA] (last updated Dec. 11, 2019).
2. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, JENNIFER LAKE, LISA SEGHETTI, JAMES MONKE & STEPHEN
VIÑA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32399, BORDER SECURITY: INSPECTIONS PRACTICES, POLICIES,
AND ISSUES 10–11 (2005). All travelers entering the United States must present themselves to a
Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) officer for an initial, or “primary,” inspection. Id. These
inspections “usually last[] no longer than a minute.” Id. at 10.
3. Not to be confused with the U.S. Border Patrol, which is a component agency of CBP,
see CBP Organization Chart, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/document/
publications/cbp-organization-chart [https://perma.cc/M7CF-K95E], or U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which is a partner agency of CBP under the umbrella of the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), see Operational and Support Component, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components [https://
perma.cc/H6RH-HWKH].
4. If an officer suspects a traveler is inadmissible or otherwise violating the law, she may
refer the traveler to a more extensive “secondary” inspection. WASEM ET AL., supra note 2, at 11.
However, most travelers are not referred to secondary inspection. Id.
5. See Shirin Ghaffary, The “Smarter” Wall: How Drones, Sensors, and AI Are Patrolling
the Border, VOX (Feb. 7, 2020, 8:01 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/16/18511583/smartborder-wall-drones-sensors-ai [https://perma.cc/V9UR-NRB2] (“Thousands of ground sensors
are currently in use between ports of entry at the US border,” along with drones, “a favored tool,”
and surveillance towers).
6. Id.
7. This Note uses variations of “facial recognition,” such as “facial recognition technology”
or “facial recognition systems,” interchangeably.
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Ysidro—and every other port of entry.8 Facial recognition will also give
CBP officers a window into the most private aspects of travelers’ lives.9
FRT identifies people through the automated analysis of a person’s
facial features.10 And in recent years, it has become an increasingly
common feature of modern life—from facilitating day-to-day tasks like
unlocking cell phones11 to making consequential decisions about who
can enter the country.12 The law enforcement benefits are clear.13 But
as with any new and powerful technology, so are its flaws and potential
for abuse. FRT is often of questionable accuracy,14 and in the wrong
hands, it can be a potent tool for social repression.15
FRT also promises to stretch current constitutional doctrines as
courts grapple with this rapidly evolving technology. In fact, courts are
already confronting FRT-related issues in the context of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.16 But so far, courts
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See Jason Cipriani, iPhone Face ID Is Pretty Cool. Here’s How It Works and How To Use
It, CNET (Feb. 5, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/the-iphone-and-ipads-face-idtech-is-pretty-darn-cool-heres-how-it-works-and-how-to-use-it [https://perma.cc/CB64-DNK9]
(“When it launched Face ID in September 2017, Apple turned your close-up into the key that
unlocks your iPhone. Since then, Apple has continued to expand the number and type of devices
with Face ID . . . .”).
12. See infra Part I.B.1.
13. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2NEbiJZ [https://perma.cc/S9LB-5G89] (“Federal and
state law enforcement officers . . . had used [a facial recognition] app to help solve shoplifting,
identity theft, credit card fraud, murder and child sexual exploitation cases.”). Police departments
across the country are using FRT systems, like Clearview AI, to identify suspects and solve crime.
See, e.g., id.
14. See CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEORGETOWN L.
CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE
RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 46–47 (2016) [hereinafter THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP], https://
www.perpetuallineup.org [https://perma.cc/7BPC-PUBB] (“Compared to fingerprinting, stateof-the-art face recognition is far less reliable . . . .”). This is especially true when applied to people
of color. Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://
nyti.ms/3dAQA89 [https://perma.cc/N5X8-2ZXJ]. Issues related to the accuracy of FRT are
beyond the scope of this Note.
15. See Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance To Subdue
Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2HwEiRc [https://perma.cc/BMW6-55M3]
(explaining the use of FRT to monitor and subdue minority populations in China).
16. E.g., United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1179 (D. Nev. 2020). These cases
have typically involved the compelled unlocking of a smart phone using FRT. See, e.g., id. (holding
law enforcement violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
“when they forcibly unlocked his smartphone . . . by holding it up to his face”).
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have avoided directly addressing the Fourth Amendment search and
seizure issues associated with FRT.17 Yet, as the technology becomes a
staple in law enforcement investigations, it is only a matter of time
before courts address these issues head on. In anticipation of these
challenges, scholars have devoted significant attention to FRT.18 They
largely focus on how the Fourth Amendment might regulate facial
recognition in domestic law enforcement settings.19 Very few scholars,20
however, have addressed how the Fourth Amendment applies to FRT
used at international borders,21 where Fourth Amendment protections
are often already diminished.22
17. E.g., id. at 1186 n.6 (“[T]he Court need not, and does not, reach Defendant’s Fourth
Amendment argument as to the same issue.”); United States v. Jackson, 19-CR-6026CJS, 2020
WL 810747, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020) (declining to reach the question of whether the
Fourth Amendment permits compelled unlocking of a phone using FRT on the grounds that the
evidence would have been inevitably discovered).
18. A Westlaw search of law reviews and journals for articles using the terms “facial
recognition,” “Fourth Amendment,” and “search” recovered 242 pieces. Term Search in
Secondary Sources, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (in the
search bar, type “‘facial recognition,’ and ‘Fourth Amendment’ and ‘search’” and limit the
Publication Type to “Law Reviews and Journals”).
19. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 505–39 (2012)
(exploring the Fourth Amendment considerations of FRT); Sabrina A. Lochner, Note, Saving
Face: Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Mobile Facial Recognition Technology & Iris Scans,
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 214–17 (2013) (arguing police use of FRT is not a search); Elizabeth Snyder,
Note, “Faceprints” and the Fourth Amendment: How the FBI Uses Facial Recognition To Conduct
Unlawful Searches, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 260–70 (2018) (arguing the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (“FBI’s”) use of FRT is a search).
20. To date, the only scholar to have addressed this particular issue with any depth has been
Professor Andrew Ferguson. In the context of a larger piece on the Fourth Amendment
implications of FRT, Professor Ferguson briefly notes that the use of face verification at the
border is most likely constitutional. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the
Fourth Amendment, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1105, 1205–07 (2021) (arguing that its use may be allowed
given precise legislation). Similarly, Brandon Thompson, in a piece exploring the Fourth
Amendment issues with DHS’s biometric data collection system, briefly suggests the Fourth
Amendment may limit the use of FRT at the border and proposes a legislative solution. Brandon
R. Thompson, Note, Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART) Data Collection:
Fourth Amendment Considerations & Suggested Statutory Alternatives, 29 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
155, 170–71 (2019).
21. For purposes of this Note, the “border” means the physical border with either Mexico or
Canada. How FRT might be regulated in near-the-border contexts, like roving stops, see, e.g.,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975) (articulating circumstances under
which U.S. Border Patrol officers may stop vehicles while on roving patrol), is beyond the scope
of this Note.
22. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985) (noting that the
“expectation of privacy [is] less at the border than in the interior”). For example, searches that
would be clearly unconstitutional if conducted without a warrant in the “interior” would pass
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This Note is the first to comprehensively address how the Fourth
Amendment might regulate facial recognition at the border. It argues
that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States,23
the Fourth Amendment must offer some protection against the
suspicionless use of FRT at the border. Drawing a distinction between
two uses of FRT—face verification and face identification—this Note
argues that the use of face identification at the border is a “search”
implicating the Fourth Amendment only when the images displayed to
an officer reveal “the privacies of life.”24 Because of the lack of caselaw
applying the Fourth Amendment to FRT at the border,25 this Note
applies the existing border-search doctrine and argues that this form of
face identification is particularly invasive and constitutes a nonroutine
border search. As a nonroutine search, face identification—unlike
mere verification—is unconstitutional without individualized,
reasonable suspicion.26 Further, reasonable suspicion must be tied to a
crime that relates to the purposes underlying the border-search
doctrine.27
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I explains how FRT operates
and how it is currently deployed at the border, and Part II outlines the
Fourth Amendment doctrine defining “searches” after Carpenter. Part
III then describes the border-search doctrine and the scope of Fourth

Fourth Amendment muster at the border. Compare United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404
(2012) (holding the physical placement of a GPS tracker on a car is a search requiring a warrant),
with United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (permitting the removal of a
gas tank without a warrant or individualized suspicion).
23. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
24. See id. at 2214 (“[T]he [Fourth] Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against
‘arbitrary power.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
25. A Westlaw search for cases using the terms “facial recognition,” “Fourth Amendment,”
and “border” recovered only eight cases. Term Search in Secondary Sources, WESTLAW, https://
1.next.westlaw.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (in the search bar, search for All Federal Cases,
type “‘facial recognition,’ and ‘Fourth Amendment’ and ‘border’” and limit the results to those
containing these precise terms). None of these cases explored whether the use of FRT at the
border constitutes a search.
26. Individual suspicion is reasonable when there are “specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,” justify a search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21 (1968). Probable cause is a higher standard. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–
76 (1949) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is
being committed.” (alterations in original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925))).
27. See infra Part III.A.
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Amendment protections available at the border. Next, Part IV poses a
hypothetical border-search situation involving the use of FRT to frame
the discussion of when, if at all, the use of FRT at the border constitutes
a search. Finally, Part V argues that in certain circumstances, the
suspicionless use of facial recognition at the border is an unreasonable
search absent an officer having individualized, reasonable suspicion to
justify it.
I. FACIAL RECOGNITION AT THE BORDER
The Fourth Amendment exists, in part, to “place obstacles in the
way of a too permeating police surveillance.”28 Yet new technologies
threaten to impose that very surveillance. To avoid leaving Fourth
Amendment protections “at the mercy of advancing technology,”29 as
the Supreme Court has cautioned against, any application of the
Fourth Amendment to new surveillance tools must begin with an
understanding of that technology’s capabilities. This Part describes
how FRT operates. It then distinguishes between FRT’s use for face
verification and identification, and it concludes by discussing the
technology’s deployment at the border.
A. Introduction to Facial Recognition Technology
1. How the Technology Works. At its core, facial recognition is an
automated form of biometrics that identifies a person based on his or
her unique facial features.30 The facial recognition process has three
basic stages. First, during the collection and extraction stage, a
computer algorithm scans an image to detect any human faces present
in the frame.31 Scans can occur in real time using an FRT-equipped
camera or after the fact by scanning video footage and photographs
captured in the past.32 If the camera detects a face, the algorithm then

28. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
29. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).
30. Facial Recognition, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (last updated Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter
EFF, Facial Recognition], https://www.eff.org/pages/face-recognition [https://perma.cc/2GL6ZSXP]. Although each facial recognition system is different, FRT systems will typically plot
virtual points on a person’s face and measure the distance between features such as a person’s
eyes or the shape of a person’s chin. Id.
31. THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP, supra note 14, at 9.
32. See id. at 10–12, 22 (noting that police can perform face identification “in real-time,”
when “[a] face recognition program extracts faces from live video feeds of one or more security
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aligns the image, measures the distance between key facial features,
and extracts those measurements to create a unique, numerical code
known as a face template.33
Second, during the comparison and matching stage, facialrecognition software compares the extracted face template against
other templates generated from known faces stored in a comparison
database.34 These databases are built by both governmental and private
entities and are populated with images from governmental and
commercial sources.35 Third, after completing the comparison, the
software returns a probabilistic “match” indicating who the software
concludes is the person in the original image.36 Depending on how a
user adjusts the software’s settings, the system will return the most
likely matches—it will usually be just a few—or all matches that meet
a predetermined confidence threshold.37 Because the user can
customize the search, what the matching process looks like in practice
depends on how law enforcement is using FRT.
2. How the Technology Is Used. FRT has a variety of uses.38 In
general, these uses can be split into two groups: face verification and
face identification.39 Beginning with the former, the use of face
verification is widespread and varies from unlocking smart phones to
confirming someone’s identity at the border.40 Its purpose is to
“confirm[] that a particular human face . . . matches a preset digital

cameras and continuously compares them,” or after a stop or an arrest, when a “mug shot may be
searched against the existing entries” in a database).
33. EFF, Facial Recognition, supra note 30.
34. Id.
35. See Hill, supra note 13. Governmental sources may, for example, include images from
driver’s license photos or criminal mugshot databases. See EFF, Facial Recognition, supra note 30
(describing the images contained in the FBI’s image database). Private companies like Clearview
AI may, on the other hand, collect images from social media sites through a process known as
“scraping.” Hill, supra note 13.
36. See EFF, Facial Recognition, supra note 30 (“Some face recognition systems, instead of
positively identifying an unknown person, are designed to calculate a probability match score
between the unknown person and specific face templates stored in the database. These systems
will offer up several potential matches, ranked in order of likelihood . . . .”).
37. For more information on the confidence thresholds used to generate matches, see infra
notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
38. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 1112–13.
39. See, e.g., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP, supra note 14, at 10.
40. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 1113 & n.41.
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image of that face.”41 Face verification can operate in a couple ways.
For one, it can collect a person’s face template in real time and compare
it to a single image of that person.42 It then produces a binary, yes-orno response (a “one-to-one match”) as to whether both images are the
same person.43 Alternatively, a user can submit a photo to the faceverification system to have it compared against a broader set of
constrained pictures from sources like travel documents.44
Second, FRT can go beyond mere verification to be used for face
identification. Such systems identify an unknown person by collecting
his or her picture and “querying an entire gallery of images in a
database to find an image similar to a submitted image.”45 Rather than
return a simple one-to-one match, face-identification systems display a
“candidate list” comprising all the images a system believes resemble
the submitted image.46 How many images the software returns depends
on the confidence threshold set by the user.47 For example, if a user sets
a similarity score of seventy-five, then the system will return all images
that have a 75 percent or greater likelihood of matching the person in
the submitted image. Setting the score to ninety-nine will, of course,
return fewer images.48 Law enforcement officers typically use face41. Id. at 1113.
42. For example, a CBP official may verify a traveler’s identity by comparing a single, real-time
photo with the image on the travel document presented by the traveler. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-056, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE TRAVELER VERIFICATION
SERVICE 2, 33 (2018) [hereinafter TVS PRIVACY IMPACT], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy-pia-cbp056-tvs-january2020_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW7J-JE3Z] (describing
how CBP compares “real-time photographs” against other face templates).
43. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 1114; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/ICE/PIA-054,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ICE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION SERVICES 3 (2020)
[hereinafter ICE PRIVACY IMPACT], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacypia-ice-frs-054-may2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5LA-GDWQ] (describing face verification as a
one-to-one matching system).
44. See TVS PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 42, at 4 (describing how TVS face verification
compares the submitted photo against “photographs captured by CBP during previous entry
inspection, photographs from U.S. passports and U.S. visas, and photographs from other DHS
encounters”). Constrained images are pictures that have minimized the variables impacting
accuracy such as “poses, expressions, lighting, and distances.” ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note
43, at 3. Unconstrained images are pictures that have not eliminated variables impacting image
quality. Id. An example of an unconstrained image is the prototypical social media profile picture,
which may be taken at an angle or include other people.
45. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 3.
46. Id. at 4–5.
47. Id. at 4.
48. See id. (noting that a lower similarity score results in a larger number of images). This
system is also found in the commercial context. Amazon’s facial recognition system, known as
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identification systems to identify suspects during criminal
investigations.49 Although face verification and identification operate
similarly during collection and extraction, each raises distinct
constitutional concerns during the comparison and matching process,
as Parts IV and V discuss.
B. Facial Recognition at the Border
The deployment of FRT at the nation’s borders comes primarily
in two forms and largely maps onto the verification–identification
distinction explained above. On one hand, CBP uses face verification
to confirm the identities of people entering the United States through
ports of entry. On the other hand, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) uses face identification during criminal
investigations both at and away from the border.
1. Face Verification at Ports of Entry. The Department of
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Biometric Entry/Exit Program, known
as the Traveler Verification Service (“TVS”), is the predominant use
of FRT at the border.50 First piloted in 2016, the TVS verifies the
identities of travelers entering or exiting the United States.51 And
ultimately, the DHS aims to deploy face verification at all ports of
entry—including air, sea, and land—under the auspices of agencies like
CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”).52
The TVS collection and comparison process differs depending on
the system’s operational environment. These differences ultimately
impact the kinds of images available to a border official evaluating a
traveler’s admissibility into the United States. For example, a person
arriving by air will have her photograph taken at customs and
compared against a “gallery of known identities, based on the

Rekognition, allows users to set the confidence threshold themselves. See AMAZON WEB SERVS.,
AMAZON REKOGNITION: DEVELOPER GUIDE 130 (2020), https://docs.aws.amazon.com/
rekognition/latest/dg/rekognition-dg.pdf#face-feature-differences [https://perma.cc/9BAS-9GV4].
49. EFF, Facial Recognition, supra note 30. One well-known example is that of Clearview
AI. Hill, supra note 13.
50. See TVS PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 42, at 4 (“CBP will use the TVS as its backend
matching service for all biometric entry and exit operations that use facial recognition . . . .”).
51. Id. at 1–2.
52. See id. at 45 (“CBP has been working with the Transportation Security
Administration . . . to test the TVS process for verifying traveler identities using the TVS camera
technology and matching services at the TSA security screening checkpoint.” (footnote omitted)).
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manifests for all incoming flights for that day.”53 If one is arriving by
land in a personally owned vehicle, a photograph is taken of the driver
as she approaches the border.54 That image is compared against a
gallery of recent travelers and images from travel documents.55
Pedestrians, on the other hand, have their photograph taken as they
approach the border and present their travel document to the CBP
officer.56 The officer then performs a one-to-one match to confirm the
traveler’s photograph matches what is on the travel document.57
If the TVS verifies the traveler’s identity, then the traveler may
enter or exit the United States, and the image is either immediately
deleted or temporarily retained by DHS.58 If the TVS fails to verify a
traveler’s identity, the individual may be subject to further inspection.59
Current DHS policy gives some travelers the ability to opt out of TVS
and choose a traditional, in-person inspection.60
2. Face Identification During Criminal Investigations at the Border.
ICE currently uses face identification during criminal investigations
conducted by its investigative arm, Homeland Security Investigations
(“HSI”).61 Although it is authorized to operate away from the border,62
HSI often conducts operations at the border in partnership with other
agencies, like CBP.63 ICE uses a variety of facial recognition services

53. Id. at 30.
54. Id. at 34 (describing how CBP “uses cameras at vehicle inbound lanes in order to take
the facial images of vehicle occupants ‘at speed’ (under 20 mph) and biometrically match the new
images against a TVS gallery of recent travelers”).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 33.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 8–9.
59. Id. at 35.
60. See id. at 19–20. Currently, only U.S. citizens may opt out of a TVS scan. See id. at 20.
61. See ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 2, 5–6 (“HSI uses [facial recognition
services’] many query functionalities to generate candidate lists to identify an unknown person or
to locate a known person who may be using an alias or assumed identity. These requests are made
in furtherance of ongoing investigations on a case-by-case basis.” (footnote omitted)).
62. See Domestic Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/
domestic-operations [https://perma.cc/B7AN-KKEH] (listing the cities where HSI operates
domestically).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed,
No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (describing how HSI agents supported a CBP investigation at the
San Ysidro Port of Entry). HSI’s authority to combat “cross-border criminal activity” empowers
the agency to investigate crimes that are not necessarily restricted to the border. See Homeland
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(“FRS”) from different vendors, like Clearview AI,64 to identify
unknown people.65 The comparison databases underlying these FRSs
pose significant privacy concerns because they give ICE agents access
to a large number of images of people regardless of whether they have
committed a crime or even crossed a border before.66 Additionally,
these images may reveal deeply personal information.
ICE’s image-collection process is broader in some respects than
that used by TVS. Rather than capturing photos in real time, ICE
agents collect images from previously taken photographs or videos.67
Sources include surveillance camera footage, social media websites,
and images from seized digital devices.68 Agents then submit these
photos to an FRS for comparison against the particular FRS vendor’s
database in hopes of identifying the person in question.69
Which FRS vendor an ICE agent uses determines the number and
kind of images the agent’s search will return. If an agent submits an
image to a federal-government FRS, the submitted image could be
compared against millions of images drawn from government
documents, such as passports and visas, images collected during FBI
investigations, and national security watchlists.70 ICE agents can also
submit photos to FRSs operated by state and local law enforcement
agencies to compare submitted photos against state DMV and criminal
history records.71 Finally, an agent can submit an image to commercial
Security Investigations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/hsi [https://
perma.cc/M5FV-9SWG] (listing the crimes that HSI is authorized to investigate).
64. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 17. In late 2020, Clearview AI signed a contract
with ICE to provide “mission support” services to HSI’s ongoing criminal investigations. Kim
Lyons, ICE Just Signed a Contract with Facial Recognition Company Clearview AI, VERGE (Aug.
19, 2020, 3:19 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/14/21368930/clearview-ai-ice-contractprivacy-immigration [https://perma.cc/4BAM-VLAU].
65. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 16–17. An ICE agent can use an FRS only when
its use is “directly relevant to an investigation.” Id. at 6.
66. For example, since 2018, ICE officials have run nearly one hundred face-identification
searches of the Maryland driver’s license database—which contains photos, addresses, and names of
over seven million Maryland drivers—without state or court approval in an effort to identify
undocumented immigrants. Drew Harwell & Erin Cox, ICE Has Run Facial-Recognition Searches
on Millions of Maryland Drivers, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2020, 10:55 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/26/ice-has-run-facial-recognition-searches-millionsmaryland-drivers [https://perma.cc/CRP4-NY9T].
67. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 6.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 9 (describing HSI’s process for submitting photos to an FRS).
70. Id. at 13–16.
71. Id. at 12–13.
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vendors—like Clearview AI—that “maintain their own repository of
images collected from either their own processes or searches of open
source systems.”72 These databases can contain countless
unconstrained images pulled from an even wider range of sources like
social media websites and CCTV camera footage.73
If the image submission returns a match, the FRS displays to the
investigating agent a candidate list of all potentially similar images.74
Again, because the agent can adjust the similarity score in the search’s
settings,75 the number of images that populate the candidate list may
be left to the agent’s discretion.76 If an image is collected from an opensource website, the FRS may display the source URL to the officer.77
Taken together, an ICE agent can potentially access many images that
both collectively and individually reveal private—possibly deeply
personal—information unrelated to a criminal investigation.
Given the privacy concerns associated with face identification,
ICE has implemented several safeguards designed to minimize its
intrusive effects. ICE agents may submit photos only to FRS vendors
that have been preapproved by HSI or the agent’s supervisor, unless
exigent circumstances warrant the service’s immediate use.78 Any
approved FRS vendor that returns images containing multiple people
must isolate and display only the matched individual’s face.79
Additionally, photos submitted to the FRS must be directly relevant to
an ongoing HSI investigation,80 but matches cannot be used to trigger
law enforcement action on their own.81 These agency safeguards are a
step in the right direction because they limit unchecked intrusion into

72. Id. at 16–17.
73. Id. at 16; Madhumita Murgia, Who’s Using Your Face? The Ugly Truth About Facial
Recognition, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/cf19b956-60a2-11e9-b2853acd5d43599e [https://perma.cc/8LCP-KRFR].
74. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 9.
75. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
76. Cf. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 4–5 (describing how the confidence levels
set by the agent will influence the number of images returned).
77. Id. at 17.
78. Id. at 6–7. ICE protocols, however, do not specify what constitutes an “exigent
circumstance.”
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id. at 6.
81. See id. at 11 (“HSI agents are instructed that any vetted FRS candidate match must be
further investigated by the HSI agent receiving the lead prior to ICE taking any enforcement
action against an individual.”).
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personal privacy. But agency protocols, which are subject to change
both over time and based on leadership, are no substitute for
constitutional protections.82 After all, “the Founders did not fight a
revolution to gain the right to government agency protocols.”83 The
Constitution must provide an independent limit on the conduct of
government agents.84 And one source for those potential constitutional
limits is the Fourth Amendment.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH DOCTRINE
The Fourth Amendment protects people within the United
States85 against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”86 But if a
government action is not a search (or seizure), then “the Fourth
Amendment provides no protection at all.”87 So, the threshold inquiry
is: Does the use of FRT at the border constitute a search?88 If so, then
as Part III details, a court must determine whether that search was
reasonable.89

82. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 398 (2014) (rejecting the government’s assurances
that it would develop internal protocols to address privacy concerns relating to cloud computing).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 398, 403 (holding that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for a cell
phone search, despite assurances from the government that agencies would “develop protocols to
address” cloud computing issues).
85. The Court has typically applied the Fourth Amendment to searches of noncitizens at the
border. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 533, 539 (1985) (“Having
presented herself at the border for admission, . . . respondent was entitled to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.”). However, after United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the
application of the Fourth Amendment to aliens who are in the United States, but who have not
“developed substantial connections” to the United States, is an open question. 494 U.S. 259, 271–
73 (1990); see also Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 840–
42 (2013) (“Whether aliens located within U.S. territory must satisfy the substantial connections
test, or whether something less is sufficient, remains unresolved.”).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
87. BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 211 (2017); see
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (noting that “the application of the Fourth
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim” a search
occurred).
88. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–14 (2018) (noting that Fourth
Amendment protection rests upon the existence of a “search” and focusing the analysis on
whether the use of a new technology constitutes an unreasonable search).
89. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (“The Fourth Amendment commands that
searches and seizures be reasonable. What is reasonable depends upon all of the
circumstances . . . .”).
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A search occurs, as the Court held in Katz v. United States,90 when
the government intrudes into an arena where a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.91 That test has both subjective and objective
components.92 Subjectively, a person must demonstrate an “actual
expectation of privacy.”93 Objectively, that expectation must “be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”94 The “basic
guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment—namely, shielding “the
privacies of life [from] arbitrary power” and “plac[ing] obstacles in the
way of a too permeating police surveillance”—enhance the scope of
this right.95 Common sense suggests that this framework would
encompass a wide range of law enforcement activity.96 But in practice,
post-Katz caselaw has limited the scope of what constitutes a
“search.”97 This Part begins by surveying the Fourth Amendment
doctrines that, pre-Carpenter, restricted the scope of what constitutes
a “search.” It then discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in
Carpenter, how it has reshaped the “search” analysis, and how it
impacts the constitutionality of FRT.
A. Pre-Carpenter Limits on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
When there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, there is no
Fourth Amendment “search.” Prior to Carpenter, the Court’s decisions
established limiting principles constraining what could count as a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Two in particular—activities and
spaces visible to others and the third-party doctrine—posed challenges
for classifying the use of FRT as a “search” for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.

90. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
91. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that the scope of the Fourth
Amendment is related to a place where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy).
92. See id. (stating a search occurs when the government intrudes on a subjective expectation
of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).
96. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 211 (“Common sense would seem to dictate that
whenever the government comes snooping, that’s a search.”).
97. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, GOVERNANCE STUD. AT BROOKINGS, IS THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT RELEVANT IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE? 3–9 (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1208_4th_amendment_slobogin.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7C2-9Y2U]
(summarizing the three doctrines that, post-Katz, have limited the scope of what constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search).
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First, activities and spaces visible to others are not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection given that they are “knowingly
expose[d] to the public.”98 Due to this principle, the Fourth
Amendment typically does not protect from the mere observation of a
person’s physical characteristics, including one’s facial features.99 As a
result, the Fourth Amendment offers fewer protections against law
enforcement collection of biometrics by noninvasive means—like
photography.100 Like photographing a person, FRT might not amount
to a search. The system takes a photo in real time or uses one submitted
by a law enforcement officer for verification or identification. Yet to
the contrary, some argue that FRT actually goes one step further. They
argue that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in identity
while in public—that is, a privacy to remain relatively anonymous while
in public spaces.101 Because revealing a person’s identity using FRT
would violate that expectation, the argument goes, such use of FRT is
arguably a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.102
Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that law enforcement’s
observation of one’s public movements is not a search. For instance, in
United States v. Knotts,103 the Court held that the GPS tracking of a car
was not a search because the vehicle’s location on public roads was
conveyed to the public.104 Thus, to the extent FRT—like GPS—reveals
one’s location because the background of an unconstrained photo
betrays where the photo was taken, the Fourth Amendment would
have historically offered little protection. But even pre-Carpenter, this

98. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
99. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (“No person can have a reasonable
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.”).
100. See, e.g., In re. Search of [Redacted] Washington, D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 531 (D.D.C.
2018) (collecting cases). Some commentators argue that facial recognition is simply another form
of photography and, therefore, is not a search. See, e.g., Lochner, supra note 19, at 214–17
(“[U]nder both the trespass test and Katz test, FRT is not likely to be a Fourth Amendment
search.”).
101. See Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591, 1600–19
(2017) (arguing FRT infringes on one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in identity while in
public); see also Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691,
725–61 (2015) (arguing for the Fourth Amendment significance of anonymity).
102. Hirose, supra note 101, at 1600.
103. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
104. Id. at 281–82.
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conclusion was not inevitable. Indeed, in United States v. Jones,105
Justice Sonia Sotomayor reasoned in a concurring opinion that with
sufficient locational data, police might learn enough about a person’s
private life to make such surveillance a search.106 Further, she
suggested that due to technological advances, the Court would need to
look more closely at what privacy means in the digital age.107
Second, under the third-party doctrine, information voluntarily
conveyed to another is not entitled to an expectation of privacy.108 The
Court has explained that an individual “takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person
to the [g]overnment.”109 In practice, this doctrine empowered the
government to freely access records held by third parties—such as
banks and phone companies—without implicating the Fourth
Amendment.110 To the extent FRT relies on similar third-party
information, the Fourth Amendment would have offered little
protection. In short, pre-Carpenter caselaw limited the scope of what
constituted a reasonable expectation of privacy so much that law
enforcement use of FRT was arguably unregulated by the Fourth
Amendment.
B. Carpenter Searches
Before 2018, the case for classifying the use of FRT as a search was
difficult because of these limiting principles. However, the Court’s
landmark decision in Carpenter fundamentally altered this analysis.111
105. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
106. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that GPS-monitoring can “generate[]
a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations” that should be
relevant to the search analysis).
107. See id. at 417–18 (arguing that the third-party doctrine may be “ill suited to the digital
age” where people disclose a “great deal” of personal information during even “mundane tasks”).
108. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979) (permitting the warrantless use of a
pen register to record calling history); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443–45 (1976)
(permitting the warrantless collection of bank records).
109. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
110. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 97, at 7–9 (detailing how the third-party doctrine permits the
governmental collection of private, digital information “free and clear of Fourth Amendment
constraints”).
111. See, e.g., ORIN S. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH
AMENDMENT (forthcoming in Oxford University Press) (manuscript at 1) [hereinafter KERR,
Implementing Carpenter], https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3301257 [https://perma.cc/VG2SPK7N] (discussing Carpenter as “embark[ing] on a new path” of Fourth Amendment
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There, the Court examined whether government collection of CSLI
held by a third party could, in some circumstances, constitute a
search.112
Timothy Carpenter was suspected of being involved in a string of
cell-phone-store robberies over a four-month period.113 During the
course of the investigation, the government sought a court order—
based on less than probable cause—to compel the disclosure of more
than five months of Carpenter’s aggregated CSLI data.114 After
receiving 127 days of CSLI data, the government noticed, and
ultimately argued at trial, “that Carpenter was right where
the . . . robbery was at the exact time of the robbery.”115 He was
convicted and sentenced to over one hundred years in prison.116 On
appeal, Carpenter argued that the government’s warrantless collection
of his CSLI violated the Fourth Amendment.117
The Court agreed that collecting aggregate data on Carpenter’s
location was a Fourth Amendment search.118 Although Carpenter’s
holding was narrow,119 the decision’s rationale marked an evolution in
Fourth Amendment doctrine that—as courts are beginning to
recognize—carries significant implications for the constitutionality of
modern surveillance techniques.120 A close reading of Carpenter
jurisprudence); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128
YALE L.J. F. 943, 943 (2019) (discussing how Carpenter limits the third-party doctrine); Paul Ohm,
The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 358 (2019) (noting “Carpenter
work[ed] a series of revolutions in Fourth Amendment law”); Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm.
Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 206 (2018)
(discussing Carpenter’s effect on the third-party doctrine).
112. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
113. Id. at 2212.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2212–13 (quoting Joint Appendix at 131, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206 (2018) (No. 16-402), 2017 WL 3614549, at *131).
116. Id. at 2213.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2219.
119. Id. at 2220.
120. For examples of the modern technologies being evaluated under the Carpenter
framework, see generally United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307, 311–13 (5th Cir. 2020)
(considering Carpenter’s application to a collection of Bitcoin transactions but ultimately rejecting
it); Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 456 F. Supp. 3d 699, 715–17 (D. Md.),
aff’d, 979 F.3d 219, reh’g en banc granted, 831 Fed. App’x. 662 (4th Cir. 2020) (considering
Carpenter’s application to advanced aerial surveillance); United States v. Carme, No. 19-10073RGS, 2020 WL 3270877, at *4–5 (D. Mass. June 17, 2020) (considering Carpenter’s application to
forensic deciphering of BitTorrent software but ultimately rejecting it); Commonwealth v.
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highlights several key factors relevant to the Fourth Amendment
analysis of governmental surveillance tools that access third-party
records.121 In particular, those factors include the sophistication of the
technology in question and the absence of any meaningful disclosure
to the third party collecting the data.
First, the impact of modern technology was central to Carpenter’s
rationale and holding.122 The CSLI data collected by the government
was only available because of “seismic shifts in digital technology.”123
This technology, in turn, gave the government seamless—and nearly
instantaneous—access to “an entirely different species” of information
about individuals.124 Before the digital age, the cost and logistical
challenges associated with continuous physical surveillance made
obtaining similar locational information nearly impossible.125 But now,
locational information like CSLI is captured continuously, is accurate,
and does not require physical surveillance.126 Importantly, because
CSLI tracks a person’s cell phone—which is frequently on one’s
person—CSLI gives law enforcement an even more comprehensive
profile of a person’s movements than tracking a vehicle would.127 Given
the novel concerns this raised, the Court could not easily extend prior
precedents.128 Thus, the use of digital surveillance technology that gives
the government seamless access to a qualitatively and quantitatively
different kind of record implicates Carpenter.129

McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1099–107 (Mass. 2020) (considering Carpenter in its analysis of
automated license plate readers); State v. Muhammad, 451 P.3d 1060, 1071–74 (Wash. 2019)
(applying Carpenter to real-time CSLI).
121. See KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 16–27) (discussing
three components of a Carpenter search).
122. Id. at 16.
123. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
124. Id. at 2222.
125. Id. at 2217.
126. See id. at 2217–19.
127. See id. at 2218–19 (“Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and
absolute surveillance.”).
128. See id. at 2222 (“When confronting new concerns wrought by digital technology, this
Court has been careful not to uncritically extend existing precedents.”).
129. See id. (noting that CSLI does not resemble traditional business records); supra note 120
(listing cases that adopt or distinguish the Carpenter analysis based on whether the technology
was sufficiently modern or traditional); see also KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111
(manuscript at 16–19) (discussing Carpenter as limited to digital-age technology).
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Second, the absence of any meaningful disclosure was another
significant factor driving Carpenter’s holding.130 The CSLI produced by
Carpenter’s phone was generated continuously, automatically, and
without his knowledge.131 Because there was no “affirmative act on the
part of [Carpenter] beyond powering up” his phone, Carpenter did not
voluntarily disclose his locational information in any “meaningful
sense” that justified applying the third-party doctrine.132 The Court also
rejected the government’s argument that Carpenter’s decision to use a
cell phone was equivalent to a voluntary disclosure of his CSLI data
because, as the Court noted in its earlier decision in Riley v.
California,133 cell phones are “indispensable to participation in modern
society.”134 Deciding to use a cell phone may have technically been a
voluntary disclosure, but the lack of any meaningful choice meant that
Carpenter was effectively compelled to disclose the CSLI.135 Because
the third-party doctrine does not apply to records created without a
meaningfully voluntary choice,136 the collection of those records by the
government is likely a search.
Based on these factors, Carpenter’s central innovation was
extending a reasonable expectation of privacy to third-party digital
records that reveal the “privacies of life.”137 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice John Roberts noted that the government’s collection of
127 days’ worth of historical CSLI meant that Carpenter’s movements
had effectively been surveilled every moment of his life.138 The Court
cited concerns first expressed in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
United States v. Jones and concluded that the aggregation of a person’s

130. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 20).
131. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI.”).
132. Id. (emphasis added) (reasoning that Carpenter did not “voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’
of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements” (alteration in original)
(quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979))).
133. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
134. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 385).
135. See id. (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid
leaving behind a trail of location data.”); see also KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111
(manuscript at 21) (“Carpenter has a compulsion requirement.”).
136. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
137. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 21–22).
138. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19 (“Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has
effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years . . . .”).
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movements via CSLI is “deeply revealing.”139 Following Justice
Sotomayor’s earlier argument regarding GPS tracking, the Court
concluded CSLI could also demonstrate one’s “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”140 Information that
intimate, post-Carpenter, cannot be collected by the government
without constitutional restrictions.
Thus, digital records that are similarly revealing when aggregated
may be entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.141 As a result,
when police obtain those records in pursuit of a suspect, it constitutes
a search under the Fourth Amendment. FRT and CSLI share
similarities that, as Part IV discusses, likely implicate Carpenter’s
analysis.142 But as the Court acknowledged, this rule would not carry
across all contexts.143 The next Part explores Carpenter’s application to
a new technology in a unique context: the border.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS AT THE BORDER
Even if a search has occurred, “the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”144 The baseline measure of
reasonableness is the existence of a warrant, signed by a neutral
magistrate, and supported by probable cause.145 As a general rule,
warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”146 The
“border-search exception” is one such case.147 However, exceptions to
the warrant requirement are subject to two key limitations: scope and
intrusiveness.148
139. Id. at 2217, 2223 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)).
140. Id. at 2217–18 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
141. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 22).
142. See infra Part IV.
143. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222–23. The Court recognized that the warrantless collection of
CSLI might be reasonable if there are exigent circumstances that make obtaining a warrant
unreasonable. Id. Furthermore, the Court declined to consider “collection techniques involving
foreign affairs or national security.” Id. at 2220.
144. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398, 403 (2006)).
145. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (plurality opinion).
146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
147. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977).
148. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No.
20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021).
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Given that exceptions to the warrant requirement are justified
only for limited purposes, those purposes control the scope of the
search.149 Searches that do not further the purposes underlying an
exception are outside the exception’s scope and require a warrant—or
a different exception—to be justified.150 Additionally, the manner in
which a search is conducted remains relevant to its constitutionality,
even if that search is within the scope of an enumerated exception.151
At a certain point, a search may be conducted in a manner so intrusive
that it becomes unreasonable without added Fourth Amendment
protections.152 Courts evaluate the reasonableness of a search “by
‘balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’”153
To understand how the Fourth Amendment should regulate FRT
at the border, this Part outlines the structure of the border-search
exception and the underlying purposes that control its scope. It then
describes the distinction between routine searches, which require no
individual suspicion, and nonroutine searches, which are unreasonable
without individualized suspicion. This Part concludes with a discussion
of the debate over whether electronic-device searches are routine or
nonroutine as a helpful frame for later applying the doctrine to FRT.

149. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 385–86 (declining to extend the search-incident-to-arrest exception
to cell phones that posed no risk to officer safety or of evidence destruction); Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (noting that officer safety and evidence preservation needs to “define
the boundaries of the [search-incident-to-arrest] exception”); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393–95 (1978) (holding unlawful a warrantless search based on the exigent circumstances
exception when there was no exigency).
150. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (stating that when the justifications underlying one exception are
absent, a search will be “unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another
exception to the warrant requirement applies”).
151. See Cano, 934 F.3d at 1012 (“[W]hile routine searches may be conducted at the border
without any showing of suspicion, a more intrusive, nonroutine search must be supported by
‘reasonable suspicion.’” (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537–41
(1985))).
152. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533–35, 541 (suggesting a 16-hour border
detention “beyond the scope” of a routine search would be unconstitutional without reasonable
suspicion); Cano, 934 F.3d at 1011 (“[S]ome searches, even when conducted within the scope of
the exception, are so intrusive that they require additional justification, up to and including
probable cause and a warrant.”). Notably, these protections extend equally to citizens and
noncitizens at the border.
153. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537–41 (quoting United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)).
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A. The Border-Search Doctrine
Under the border-search exception, border officials154 may
conduct warrantless, and often suspicionless, searches at the border.155
The legal authority to conduct warrantless searches is “as old as the
Fourth Amendment itself”156 and based on the United States’
“inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting,
its territorial integrity.”157 To that end, the Supreme Court has
identified several justifications that animate the border-search
doctrine. Warrantless border searches are permissible to the extent
they are needed to protect national security, collect duties, intercept
contraband, and enforce immigration laws.158 Although the precise
scope of the exception remains an open question,159 a border search
that is too attenuated from this rationale falls outside the scope of the
exception.160
Even within the scope of the exception, border searches must still
be reasonable.161 At the border, the reasonableness balance is
“qualitatively different” and weighs “much more favorably to the
Government.”162 The government’s paramount interest in border
security is weighed against the individual’s diminished—but not
154. Border searches may only be conducted by “customs and immigration officials, but not
general law enforcement such as FBI agents.” Cano, 934 F.3d at 1013; see also 19 C.F.R. § 162.6
(2020) (stating all people and objects entering the country are “liable to inspection and search by
a Customs officer”).
155. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004).
156. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
157. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 153.
158. See id. at 152–53 (acknowledging the border-search doctrine rests on the sovereign’s right
to protect itself, regulate the collection of duties, prevent the introduction of contraband, and
prevent the entry of unwanted persons into the United States). For a comprehensive review of
the United States’ customs and immigration laws, see Laura K. Donohue, Customs, Immigration,
and Rights: Constitutional Limits on Electronic Border Searches, 128 YALE L.J. F. 961, 972–93
(2019) [hereinafter Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights].
159. Compare Cano, 934 F.3d at 1016–19 (holding the border-search exception only sanctions
searches for contraband presently at the border, not “evidence of past or future border-related
crimes”), with United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 143–44 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating the bordersearch exception encompasses both the direct interception of contraband and evidence of
“ongoing transnational crime”), and United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 720–21 (4th Cir.
2019) (holding the border-search exception does not encompass searches solely for evidence of
domestic crimes).
160. See, e.g., Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 721 (holding an electronic-device search, based solely
on knowledge of domestic crimes, would go beyond the scope of the exception).
161. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
162. Id. at 538–40.
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absent—expectation of privacy.163 In practice, several factors affect the
reasonableness of a border search, including where the search takes
place and how it is conducted.
1. Where a Search Is Conducted. Searches at the physical border
or its “functional equivalent”—such as an international airport—are
almost always per se reasonable and do not require any individualized
suspicion.164 Meanwhile, searches physically removed from the border
often require some level of individualized suspicion.165
2. How a Search Is Conducted: Routine and Nonroutine Border
Searches. Recognizing that some border searches are conducted in a
more intrusive manner than others, courts distinguish between routine
and nonroutine searches. As the term connotes, most common border
searches are considered routine under existing law. This includes
identification checks, vehicle and luggage inspections, canine sniffs,
and removal of the outer garments.166 The Court has treated routine
searches as essential to furthering the government’s mission to
determine a person’s admissibility, collect customs duties, and
intercept contraband.167 More importantly, the privacy intrusion
caused by these searches—at least in the context of the government’s
163. See id. at 539 (noting a traveler’s expectation of privacy is only “less at the border than
in the interior” (emphasis added)).
164. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) (“Time and time again,
we have stated that ‘searches made at the border . . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact
that they occur at the border.’” (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977))); see
also id. at 150 (holding that a search at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry did not require reasonable
suspicion). The exception applies equally at the Canadian border and any interior airport where
an international flight can land. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.5(a) nn.14 & 16 (6th ed. 2020) (collecting cases applying the
exception at the Canadian border and international airports).
165. Known as “extended border searches,” the Court has, in some contexts, been willing to
require probable cause for these searches. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
881–82 (1975) (holding Border Patrol officers may, on a “roving-patrol,” stop a vehicle near the
border to inquire about “citizenship and immigration status . . . but any further detention or
search must be based on consent or probable cause”). For further background on the contours of
“extended border searches,” see generally LAFAVE, supra note 164, §§ 10.5(g), (h), (i), (j).
166. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 164, § 10.5(a) (describing routine searches at the
border and existing caselaw).
167. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154–55 (highlighting drug-seizure statistics prior to
holding that the removal of a gas tank is a routine search that does not violate the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 720 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that routine,
suspicionless searches at the border are permissible because of the government’s interests at the
border).
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security needs—is relatively minimal.168 Routine searches “are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border”
and require no individualized suspicion.169
This presumption of reasonableness can be rebutted, however, by
demonstrating that a particular search is so intrusive as to render it
nonroutine. Nonroutine searches go “beyond the scope of a routine
customs search”170 and are unreasonable unless supported by
individualized suspicion.171 Though there is no established test for
distinguishing between routine and nonroutine searches,172 courts have
found nonroutine searches in different factual contexts. Some courts
have found highly intrusive searches of a person’s body to be
nonroutine,173 because unlike a routine search, these “cause any person
significant embarrassment.”174 As a result, an officer must have
reasonable suspicion before she can conduct them.175 Courts typically
place body-cavity searches, for example, in this category, thus making
them nonroutine.176
The Supreme Court has also suggested that in some instances,
physically destructive searches of personal property can be nonroutine

168. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 (“[O]n many occasions, we have noted that the
expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior. We have long recognized that
automobiles seeking entry into this country may be searched.” (citation omitted)).
169. Id. at 152–53 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)).
170. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
171. See id. (holding an extended detention of a traveler to be reasonable if agents
“reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal”).
172. See YULE KIM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31826, PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER:
“BORDER SEARCHES” UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 10–14 (2009) (noting there is “no
established test that determines whether a particular search procedure is routine” and describing
different types of routine and nonroutine search criteria).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Non-routine searches
include body cavity searches, strip searches, and x-rays . . . . These types of objectively intrusive
searches would likely cause any person significant embarrassment and invade ‘the privacy and
dignity of the individual.’” (quoting United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981))).
174. Id.
175. Id. (“‘Non-routine’ border searches . . . are more intrusive and require a particularized
reasonable suspicion before a search can be conducted.”).
176. See, e.g., Bustillos v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 891 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Cavity
searches, strip searches, and x-ray examinations are all ‘non-routine.’” (citation omitted)). For
example, the forced inspection of a suspect’s rectum in search of narcotics is nonroutine. See id.
For more examples of nonroutine body searches, see generally LAFAVE, supra note 164, § 10.5(e).
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and require reasonable suspicion.177 These cases, although rare,
typically involve the permanent, physical destruction of property—
such as drilling into a car.178 Additionally, some courts have held that
border searches significantly intruding on personal privacy, even
though they do not involve the physical search of the body or
destruction of personal property, are nonroutine.179 This issue has most
commonly arisen in the context of searches of electronic devices, as the
next Section details.
B. Border Searches of Electronic Devices
Border officials have been searching electronic devices, such as
cell phones and laptops, as long as they have been in common use.180
Beginning with Riley v. California in 2014, however, the Supreme
Court has recognized the unique privacy interests associated with these
devices.181 Following this decision, lower courts split on whether
searches of electronic devices at the border can continue to be treated
as routine.182
In Riley, the Court rejected the warrantless search of an arrestee’s
cell phone pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest exception.183
Under that exception, officers searching an arrestee’s person, and any
containers within reaching distance, do not need a warrant if the search
is conducted to ensure the officers’ safety or prevent the destruction of
evidence.184 The Riley Court, however, refused to extend this exception
to cell phones.185 It reasoned that such searches exceed the scope of the
177. Cf. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004) (noting “the obvious
factual difference[s]” between removing and reassembling a fuel tank and “potentially destructive
drilling” into a vehicle).
178. See id. (collecting drilling cases).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1381–82 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating
reasonable suspicion justifies an abdominal x-ray scan).
180. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-008(A) PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
UPDATE FOR CBP BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 1–2 (2018), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PIA-CBP%20-%20Border-Searches-of-ElectronicDevices%20-January-2018%20-%20Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MKN-NYJJ] (noting CBP
first issued a policy regarding electronic-device searches in 2009).
181. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014) (describing how “[c]ell phones differ
in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an
arrestee’s person”).
182. See infra notes 196–212 and accompanying text.
183. Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–03.
184. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
185. Riley, 573 U.S. at 384–86.
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exception given that, in the vast majority of situations, an arrestee’s cell
phone poses no risk to officers and cannot be used to destroy
evidence.186 Furthermore, cell phone searches present special privacy
concerns—unlike traditional containers such as boxes or car trunks—
given the sheer amount of deeply personal information contained in
cell phones.187 Because the warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell
phone would “untether the rule from the justifications underlying
the . . . exception,”188 the Court held that officers searching a cell phone
must first obtain a warrant.189 Riley’s logic quickly raised questions
about the status of electronic-device searches at the border.190
Unlike the Riley Court,191 lower courts calibrate the level of
suspicion required for an electronic-device search at the border to the
specific kind of search that was conducted. Although there are no
established categories, courts tend to distinguish between brief, manual
inspections and more thorough, “forensic” searches of electronic
devices.192 Manual inspections are generally treated as routine searches
that do not require individualized suspicion.193 Forensic searches, on
the other hand, involve the use of specialized software to “gain
186. Id. at 386–91.
187. See id. at 393 (noting how “[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse,”
especially because of cell phones’ “immense storage capacity”).
188. Id. at 386 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).
189. See id. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a
cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
190. In the aftermath of Riley, some scholars argue that electronic-device searches must be
considered nonroutine. See, e.g., Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is a “Nonroutine”
Border Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 298–
303 (2017); Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches After Riley v. California, 90
WASH. L. REV. 1943, 1987–96 (2015).
191. The cell phone in Riley was inspected hours after the initial arrest back at the police
station. Riley, 573 U.S. at 379. However, the Court fashioned a categorical rule for all cell phone
searches rather than distinguishing between where or how a search was conducted. See id. at 398,
403 (establishing a categorical rule on how cell-phone searches are conducted and emphasizing
the need for the rule to be categorical to provide law enforcement with clear standards).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 858 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that
the manual search of defendant’s iPhone at the airport was a routine border search, but the
subsequent forensic search of the defendant’s iPhone conducted at the HSI office in Sterling,
Virginia was a “nonroutine border search requiring some level of individualized suspicion”).
193. See, e.g., Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2021) (distinguishing between
basic and advanced searches, and holding the former requires no individual suspicion); Park,
supra note 190, at 288–92 (outlining how courts have “attempted to distinguish between routine
and nonroutine [electronic-device] searches” by construing manual inspections as routine
searches and forensic searches as nonroutine searches).
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access . . . review, copy, and/or analyze [a device’s] contents.”194 These
searches may be considered nonroutine and thus may require some
level of individualized suspicion to be constitutional.195
Since Riley, a circuit split has emerged regarding the appropriate
level of Fourth Amendment protection applicable to searches of
electronic devices.196 Some courts take the position that all searches of
electronic devices are routine and do not require any level of
individualized suspicion.197 In United States v. Touset,198 for example,
the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the argument that the privacy
interests associated with digital technology changed the border-search
analysis:
[I]t does not make sense to say that electronic devices should receive
special treatment because so many people now own them or because
they can store vast quantities of records or effects. The same could be
said for a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractortrailer loaded with boxes of documents. Border agents bear the same
responsibility for preventing the importation of contraband in a
traveler’s possession regardless of advances in technology.199

Additionally, in the eyes of the Touset court, Riley’s reasoning
simply did not apply because only intrusive searches of a person’s body

194. Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights, supra note 158, at 970 (quoting U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CPD DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC
DEVICES 5 para. 5.1.4 (2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-Jan/
CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H8SU-UKRS]).
195. See, e.g., Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 858 (holding that the forensic search of the
defendant’s iPhone was a nonroutine border search requiring “some level of individualized
suspicion”).
196. Compare United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1015–18 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert.
filed, No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (reasonable suspicion required), and United States v.
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146–48 (4th Cir. 2018) (individualized suspicion required but declining to
decide the standard), with United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (no
reasonable suspicion required).
197. See, e.g., Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 (“We see no reason why the Fourth Amendment would
require suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such
requirement for a search of other personal property.”); United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631,
2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016) (“Allowing customs officials without a warrant
to forensically search an electronic device presented at an international border or its equivalent
is utterly consistent with its historical mooring of protecting the country by preventing unwanted
goods from crossing the border into the country.”).
198. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
199. Id. at 1233.
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could be considered nonroutine.200 Other courts have simply avoided
the constitutional question altogether by relying on the fact that
reasonable suspicion existed at the time of the search or by applying
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.201
On the other side of the split, several courts have held that forensic
searches of electronic devices, which typically involve the use of
specialized software, are too intrusive to be routine.202 On this line of
reasoning, such searches are unconstitutional unless predicated on
individualized suspicion.203 In reaching that conclusion, lower courts
have raised important questions about the scope of the border
exception in the digital age.
In United States v. Cano,204 the Ninth Circuit construed the bordersearch exception to only permit searches aimed at intercepting
contraband present at the border, rather than “evidence of past or
future border-related crimes.”205 Thus, forensic searches of electronic
devices are constitutional only if the officer reasonably suspects it
presently contains digital contraband.206 The Fourth Circuit has also
found electronic-device searches nonroutine, but arrived at that
conclusion via a different route. In United States v. Aigbekaen,207 it held
that “the Government must have individualized suspicion of an offense
that bears some nexus to the border search exception’s purposes of
protecting national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of

200. Id. at 1234.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding both that
reasonable suspicion existed and that the agents acted in good faith when they searched the
devices); United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2018) (applying the goodfaith exception); United States v. Ramirez, EP-18-CR-3530-PRM, 2019 WL 3502913, at *14–15
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2019) (applying both).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert.
filed, No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (“Accordingly, we hold that manual searches of cell phones
at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion, whereas the forensic examination
of a cell phone requires a showing of reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d
133, 145–56 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is clear that a forensic search of a digital phone must be treated
as a nonroutine border search, requiring some form of individualized suspicion.”).
203. Cano, 934 F.3d at 1015–18; Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 146–48.
204. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019).
205. Id. at 1018.
206. Id. at 1019–20 (concluding that “border officials may conduct a forensic cell phone search
only when they reasonably suspect that the cell phone to be searched itself contains contraband”).
207. United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. 2019).
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unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to export or import
contraband.”208
The government’s general interest in enforcing domestic criminal
law is, according to the Fourth Circuit, unrelated to the sovereign’s
interest in controlling who and what enters the country.209 Thus, a
forensic search of an electronic device exceeds the scope of the bordersearch exception when it is based entirely on knowledge of domestic
crimes, rather than cross-border crimes.210 Similarly, in Alasaad v.
Mayorkas,211 the First Circuit took a broad view of the scope of the
border exception. The Alasaad court held that the border-search
exception encompasses “search[es] for contraband, evidence of
contraband, or for evidence of activity in violation of the laws enforced
or administered by CBP or ICE.”212
Further, the courts that say electronic-device searches are
nonroutine have recognized that after Riley and Carpenter, the privacy
interests implicated by digital devices are simply too significant to
jeopardize by withholding Fourth Amendment protection.213 Courts
that have decided what level of suspicion is necessary for these searches
have settled on reasonable suspicion given its “modest, workable,” and
familiar nature.214 Given that the Fourth Amendment question
associated with FRT’s use at the border has not yet been squarely
presented to a court, there is no caselaw on how border-search law
might apply.215 The privacy issues associated with electronic-device
searches, however, offer a useful framework for evaluating a future
208. Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
209. See id. (noting the border-search exception to the warrant requirement cannot be
invoked based on a generalized interest in law enforcement).
210. Id. In Aigbekaen, the CBP officers searched the defendant’s computer because they
suspected it contained evidence of his involvement in purely domestic sex trafficking. Id. at 717–
18. The Fourth Circuit held this search “lacked sufficient . . . nexus to the sovereign interests
underlying the border search exception.” Id. at 724.
211. Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021).
212. See id. at 20–21 (noting that “the border search exception’s purpose is not limited to
interdicting contraband; it serves to bar entry to those ‘who may bring anything harmful into this
country’” (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985))).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1014–16 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert.
filed, No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (noting that the volume and sensitive nature of personal
information stored on an electronic device requires a showing of reasonable suspicion before a
forensic search); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144–47 (4th Cir. 2018) (same).
214. Cano, 934 F.3d at 1015 (quoting United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir.
2013)).
215. See supra note 25.
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case involving FRT’s use at the border. To understand how those
limitations might take shape, consider the following hypothetical
border search.
IV. WHEN IS THE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION AT THE BORDER A
SEARCH?
Imagine you are a Border Patrol officer stationed at one of the
many secondary inspection stations at the Laredo Juarez-Lincoln Port
of Entry. It is early January, so northbound traffic into Texas is an
absolute nightmare.216 The agent in the booth notifies you that another
car is coming to your station. A surveillance camera captured an image
of the driver as he approached the border in his car, but the TVS failed
to return a positive match. Therefore, he was automatically directed to
secondary inspection. You turn on your chest-mounted body camera
to record the interaction. You meet with the driver and check his
identification. He is a Nuevo Laredo resident studying in Laredo on a
student visa. When you ask why he is crossing on a Saturday, he
informs you that he is going to visit some friends before the semester
starts on Monday. He mentions that he crosses on an almost daily basis
for class.217 Another agent walks a drug-sniffing dog around the car, but
the dog does not alert. You have a hunch something is not right, but it
is also one of the busiest days of the year and more cars are coming. So,
you let him go.
Your shift ends, and, as DHS policy requires, you review your
body camera footage from the day.218 When you come back to the
footage from your encounter with the student, you remember your
hunch. You isolate a still photograph of his face and, against DHS

216. Every year, thousands of Mexican-American families—including this Author’s own—
return to Mexico to celebrate Christmas in their hometowns. Daniel Becerril, This Caravan of
Migrants Headed South to Mexico—for Christmas, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2019, 3:09 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-mexico/this-caravan-of-migrants-headed-south-tomexico-for-christmas-idUSKBN1YU0LN [https://perma.cc/6VXM-BR6M]. However, the traffic
congestion in early January—when everyone returns from the holidays—makes entry into the
United States painfully slow.
217. Charlotte West, Thousands of Students Cross the U.S.-Mexico Border Every Day To Go
to College, HECHINGER REP. (June 19, 2019), https://hechingerreport.org/thousands-of-studentscross-the-southern-border-every-day-to-go-to-college [https://perma.cc/Q9NY-VUKZ].
218. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA052, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE INCIDENT-DRIVEN VIDEO RECORDING SYSTEMS
(IDVRS) EVALUATION 5 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-piacbp052-idvrs-april2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SFR-YGN8].
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policy, send it directly to the resident HSI agent so she can run it
through an FRS.219 First, she submits the image to the standard,
approved government FRS which displays his visa photograph, driver’s
license, and images from his border crossings. Unsatisfied, you ask her
if there is any other FRS she can use. She recalls learning about a new
commercial FRS the agency had preliminarily contracted with and,
although the FRS was still in the DHS approval process, she submits
the photo. Within seconds, the FRS returns dozens of images. One
group of images appears to be from surveillance camera footage
because, in the background, you notice different landmarks like the
local mall, a church, and a school campus.
One image appears to be his Facebook profile picture, based on
the link underneath the image. But the largest set of images shows him
with several groups of people. In some of these images, he is facing the
camera and wearing a necklace bearing an image of Jesus Malverde—
a religious symbol your training and experience has taught you is
associated with drug traffickers.220 In another, he appears to be in the
background and looking slightly away from the camera. In the
foreground of this image, you notice one man carrying a pistol and
another man you recognize as a wanted cartel member. You start
accessing the source links. The first image is from his Facebook profile,
which is set to private. The other photos all appear on other people’s
profiles, although he is not tagged in any of them. Based on this
information, his crossing history, and your training, you suspect he
might be a drug courier.221 So, you tag the footage as having potential
evidentiary value and advise co-agents to send the driver to secondary
the next time he crosses. The whole process takes less than five
minutes.

219. ICE agents “must use reasonable efforts to identify the individual” through traditional
investigation techniques before submitting the image to an FRS. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra
note 43, at 6–7.
220. See Nathaniel Janowitz, A Narco-Saint, a Death Cult, and a Lost-Cause Apostle Await
the Pope in Mexico, VICE NEWS (Feb. 11, 2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/
wja4nb/a-narco-saint-a-death-cult-and-a-lost-cause-apostle-await-the-pope-in-mexico [https:/
/perma.cc/DZ42-5972]. Of course, this is not always the case as many law-abiding Catholics treat
Jesus Malverde as a saint. Id. However, border officials have treated the observation of Malverde
as a fact justifying further investigation. E.g., United States v. Valera-Delgado, 547 F. Supp. 2d.
704, 707–08 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
221. Alex Riggins, Former Student Who Recruited Classmates as Cross-Border Drug Mules Sent to
Prison, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019, 1:19 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-20/chulavista-high-schooler-who-recruited-teen-drug-mules-sent-to-prison [https://perma.cc/LNH9-JPYH].
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On Monday, he crosses again and is immediately directed to your
secondary inspection station. You run a drug canine around the car,
and this time the dog alerts by sitting down. A search reveals a secret
compartment containing two kilos of heroin. The driver is charged with
importing narcotics.222 In your report, you note that your suspicion
arose only after viewing the candidate list returned by the commercial
FRS.223 The driver moves to suppress the seized drugs on two grounds.
First, the driver challenges the initial TVS scan that misidentified him
and sent him to secondary. Second, he challenges your viewing of the
candidate list returned by the commercial FRS. Both, he alleges,
constitute illegal searches. Answering either question requires
applying “the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment” to
technology far beyond anything envisioned by its authors.224
This Part builds on the hypothetical in two ways, loosely
corresponding to the two grounds on which the suspect in the
hypothetical challenged the introduction of drugs as evidence against
him. It distinguishes between face verification and face identification,
introduced above,225 to analyze the use of FRT at the border. First,
Section A argues that the use of TVS for face verification is likely
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Second, Section B argues
that the use of commercial FRS databases for face identification likely
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, thus requiring some level
of suspicion before such a search is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.
A. Face Verification and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
The use of facial recognition at the border presents two questions
relevant to the Fourth Amendment search inquiry. Given facial
recognition’s primary purpose is to identify people, the first question is
whether people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
identity, even when subject to the diminished protections at the border.
Additionally, because FRT can only identify people after analyzing the
images contained in a comparison database, the second question is
whether, post-Carpenter, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the images contained within those databases. How these questions

222. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (2018).
223. A “hunch” is not reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
224. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part) (criticizing
the efficacy of applying the Fourth Amendment to modern technology).
225. See supra Parts I.A–I.B.
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are answered depends on whether the FRT is being used for face
verification or identification. As to the former, the use of FRT for face
verification is likely not a search under the Fourth Amendment
because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in identity at the
border.
As noted above,226 there is a plausible argument that individuals
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identity as a
general matter. Social norms reflect a subjective expectation of privacy
in one’s identity when in public. As Professor Mariko Hirose notes:
“[W]e invite ‘the intruding eye’ of strangers to glance at or even
examine our faces as we pass by, but we do not invite them to also
identify us by our names and addresses, much less occupation,
immigration status, criminal history, and other personal
information.”227 Given this social practice—and the fact that law
enforcement cannot compel someone to identify themselves without
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing228—this expectation of privacy is
likely reasonable.
However, these arguments carry less weight at the border. There,
anyone seeking to enter the United States must identify themselves
and demonstrate they are lawfully entitled to enter.229 Those whose
identities cannot be verified may be denied entry into the country.230
Normally, this poses no problem under the Fourth Amendment
because determining a traveler’s admissibility is one of the core
purposes underlying the border-search exception.231 Travelers seeking
entry into the United States, therefore, waive any expectation of
privacy in their identity at the border. However, the emerging use of
FRT to verify a traveler’s identity may change the constitutional
calculus. This is because the databases on which FRT relies to be
effective can reveal personal information unrelated to determining
226. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
227. Hirose, supra note 101, at 1601. This expectation is arguably diminished in the age of
social media, on which users regularly disclose private information. See Brian Mund, Note, Social
Media Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 238, 247–48
(2017) (describing current caselaw finding no reasonable expectation of privacy for information
disclosed on social media networks).
228. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004).
229. See generally DHS Inspection of Persons Applying for Admission, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1
(2020) (outlining the identification requirements “to lawfully enter the United States”).
230. See § 235.1(f)(1).
231. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (noting that requirements for
international travelers to identify themselves are permissible for national self-protection).
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someone’s admissibility. That is, because the FRT search goes beyond
the scope of law enforcement’s needs to determine a person’s
admissibility, and because it may reveal deeply personal information,
it risks running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
CBP’s face verification system, the TVS, likely does not violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy in third-party data in its current
form. Similar to the CSLI in Carpenter, the face verification performed
by the TVS is possible only due to “seismic shifts in digital
technology.”232 Facial recognition systems analyze a traveler’s facial
features, create a numerical face template, and compare it against
other face templates to produce a nearly instantaneous match. But
there are key differences between the TVS and the technology at issue
in Carpenter.
If the TVS is used to perform a one-to-one match, the software
compares only a travel document and a traveler’s face. Third-party
records are, by definition, not being accessed, and Carpenter is not
implicated.233 Even when the TVS accesses third-party records to verify
a traveler’s identity, those records were likely voluntarily disclosed “in
[a] meaningful sense.”234 This is so because the TVS accesses images
from governmental sources like passports, visas, and photos from
previous border crossings.235 These images are taken only after a
person takes an affirmative step to disclose their face and identity to
the government. For example, the student in the above hypothetical
would have had to apply for a student visa and voluntarily submit his
photograph to the Department of State.236 There is nothing
surreptitious about this process. The third-party doctrine likely applies
to these kinds of images and forecloses any reasonable expectation of
privacy.

232. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
233. Cf. id. at 2223 (finding the warrantless collection of CSLI to be a search, despite the fact
that the information came from a third party, “[i]n light of [its] deeply revealing
nature[,] . . . depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach”).
234. Id. at 2220 (noting the inescapable nature of CSLI).
235. See supra Part I.B.1.
236. See Student Visa, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/
study/student-visa.html [https://perma.cc/QNV9-7FJT] (listing a photo as one of the identification
requirements for a student visa). The same argument applies to images from recent border crossings.
Cameras are ubiquitous and readily visible at the border. In fact, the City of Laredo uploads live video
feeds of each border crossing. Laredo, Texas, CITY OF LAREDO, https://www.cityoflaredo.com/
bridgesys/Cameras/bridge4cam.html [https://perma.cc/Q5XP-HG9Y]. Therefore, the decision to cross
the border forecloses any expectation of privacy in one’s images from those crossings.
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Finally, these records do not reveal “the privacies of life.”237 If the
TVS is used to produce a one-to-one match, then the only information
disclosed to the border officials is that the person presenting herself is
the same person pictured on her travel document. The personal
information disclosed to border officials is similarly limited when TVS
queries a third-party database. Travel document photographs are
usually taken in a controlled setting and only display the individual’s
face.238 They typically reveal nothing about a person’s associations,
political activities, or religious beliefs239—three areas the Court was
particularly concerned with preserving the privacy of in Carpenter.240
Although images from border crossings can reveal locational
information, the inferences that can be drawn from such images are
limited. A border official viewing these photos would know only when
and how often a person crosses the border, not where a traveler was
before reaching the border or where she went after.241 The collection
of even a large number of images from previous border crossings likely
does not raise constitutionally significant privacy concerns.242 Applied
to the hypothetical, such images would only provide a snapshot of the
student’s movements—far from divulging “the privacies of life.” Given
the limited scope of the information accessed by the TVS, the use of
face verification at the border is likely not a search implicating the
Fourth Amendment.

237. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
238. E.g., Passport Photos, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
passports/how-apply/photos.html [https://perma.cc/VYR2-NEYK].
239. Of course, there are instances where a travel document may reveal information about
one’s religious beliefs—such as wearing a necklace or head covering. See id. (“You may not
wear . . . head coverings, except for religious . . . purposes and with a signed statement.”). That
information is affirmatively disclosed to the government in those cases.
240. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
241. On this issue, Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090 (Mass. 2020), provides a
useful analogy. In McCarthy, police collected automated-license-plate-reader data from cameras
stationed at two Cape Cod bridges. Id. at 1095. The court recognized that, while police certainly
collected a large amount of data, the scope of the information disclosed was fairly limited. See id.
at 1105–06. Therefore, the images did not reveal “the privacies of life,” and there was no search.
Id. at 1106.
242. Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (granting Fourth Amendment protection to CSLI, in
part, because of “its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach”).
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B. Face Identification and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Unlike face verification, face identification probably amounts to a
search because it intrudes on the reasonable expectation of privacy in
third-party digital records. Like face verification, face identification is
possible only because of advances in digital technology. But there is a
constitutionally significant difference between the kinds of records
accessed during face identification. As currently used by ICE, the
specific FRS an agent uses will determine the kinds of images she can
see. Submitting an image to a governmental FRS may access millions
of face templates generated from passports, driver’s licenses, and
criminal mugshots.243 There likely is no expectation of privacy in this
class of images. However, the use of a commercial FRS raises more
serious Fourth Amendment concerns.
The implication of a commercial vendor using “internal
processes” to collect images is that the images used for face
identification from that vendor will sometimes lack the constitutionally
required level of voluntariness.244 Consider the issue of surveillance
camera footage. Commercial vendors can populate their databases
with images collected from surveillance cameras through contracts
with private companies and government agencies or through collecting
the footage themselves.245 These images are often captured
surreptitiously and without a person’s knowledge.246 Traveling in
public, of course, exposes one to the risk that she will be seen by others.
That decision, however, does not equate to an assumption of the risk
that a private company will compile a “comprehensive dossier of
[one’s] physical movements.”247 Moreover, how could one even avoid
that risk? With nearly 70 million active surveillance cameras—roughly
243. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 12–16.
244. Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (finding that the collection of CSLI data did not trigger
the third-party doctrine because Carpenter did not in any meaningful sense voluntarily “assume[]
the risk” that his locational information would be aggregated (alteration in original) (quoting
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979))).
245. See, e.g., Murgia, supra note 73 (describing the creation of an image database by government
researchers); Jake Satisky, A Duke Study Recorded Thousands of Students’ Faces. Now They’re Being
Used All over the World, DUKE CHRON. (June 11, 2019, 9:24 PM), https://www.dukechronicle.com/
article/2019/06/duke-university-facial-recognition-data-set-study-surveillance-video-students-chinauyghur [https://perma.cc/ZHT7-JSFS] (describing how researchers collected images from surveillance
footage on a university campus).
246. See Satisky, supra note 245 (“What they might not have known is that . . . Duke
researchers were recording them and putting their likenesses into a data set.”).
247. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
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one for every four people248—the only real options are to stay home or
take affirmative steps to defeat facial recognition systems.249
The practice of collecting images via “searches of open source
systems” poses similar risks.250 Clearview AI, for example, “scrapes”
the internet for supposedly “publicly available” images from websites
like Facebook, LinkedIn, and YouTube, and it compiles them into a
single database for law enforcement use.251 But just because an image
is “publicly available” does not mean it was affirmatively disclosed to
the public. For example, in the above hypothetical, the driver’s
Facebook profile picture likely was “meaningfully disclosed” since he
affirmatively uploaded the picture to Facebook.252 But what about the
images where the driver is with his friends and facing the camera? The
awareness that his picture was being taken does not necessarily equate
to consent for his photo to be uploaded to the internet.
And the picture where he was in the background facing away from
the camera? Surely, he could not affirmatively disclose a picture he did
not know was being taken. Even if one lacks an expectation of privacy
over any single picture, the act of being in public, associating with
others, and potentially having your picture taken does not necessarily
equal an assumption of the risk that all of these pictures will be secretly
collected and aggregated in a database. Regardless, a commercial
vendor like Clearview AI collects each of these images, without

248. Liza Lin & Newley Purnell, A World with a Billion Cameras Watching You Is Just
Around the Corner, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/abillion-surveillance-cameras-forecast-to-be-watching-within-two-years-11575565402 [https://
perma.cc/9B82-XAL6].
249. “Defeating” facial recognition refers to measures taken to prevent an FRS from
identifying someone. This often entails obstructing a clear view of one’s face or interfering with
an FRT-enabled camera. See COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., VIOLENT ADVERSARIES LIKELY TO USE PROTECTIVE MASKS TO EVADE FACIAL
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 1–2 (2020), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6989376-UFOUO-in-Violent-Adversaries-Likely-to-Use.html [https://perma.cc/QM52-4E5A] (describing
methods used to defeat facial recognition).
250. See ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 16 (describing how these systems may
violate the privacy standards of social media platforms).
251. Hill, supra note 13.
252. This hypothetical of course assumes the suspect had a certain level of consent to his
images being online. A much more troubling case would exist in the case of someone who chooses
not to have an online presence but whose image was captured incidentally in another person’s
photo and uploaded to the internet.
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distinction, and displays them to law enforcement.253 This directly
implicates Carpenter.
The images displayed by a commercial FRS can collectively reveal
the “privacies of life” in at least two ways. Commercial FRSs that
display surveillance camera footage can disclose a person’s locational
information, depending on the camera’s location.254 With enough
surveillance footage, a border official could access “a comprehensive
chronicle of [a person’s] past movements.”255 This, the Court said in
Carpenter, gives the government “an intimate window into a person’s
life,” because locational information “reveal[s] . . . ‘familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”256 If both sets reveal
the same substantive information, it makes little sense to privilege
locational information revealed directly by CSLI over locational
information revealed incidentally by FRT.257
Most importantly—and unlike the CSLI in Carpenter—face
identification directly reveals the personal information protected
under Carpenter. For example, ICE acknowledges that it uses
commercial FRSs that “scrape” social media websites.258 When these
images are unconstrained, they can display everyone and everything
contained in the picture. A border official can, as the hypothetical
illustrates, learn who one’s friends are or simply who is nearby. A
border official can determine religious or political affiliations based on
where someone is or what they are wearing. Depending on the number
of pictures available online, the entirety of a person’s private life could
be displayed to any border official who decides to use a commercial
FRS. If individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
locational records because they reveal “the privacies of life” by
inference, as in Carpenter,259 then images that reveal that same
253. Hill, supra note 13.
254. For example, if you live in Los Angeles, a company could hypothetically contract with
Caltrans to access its network of CCTV cameras and capture your movements on most freeways.
Caltrans CCTV Map, CALTRANS, http://cwwp2.dot.ca.gov/vm/iframemap.htm [https://perma.cc/
3JMX-8L9W].
255. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
256. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)).
257. Moreover, Carpenter did not foreclose the possibility that its reasoning could apply to
data that reveals location incidentally. See id. at 2220 (“Nor do we address other business records
that might incidentally reveal location information.”).
258. ICE PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 43, at 16.
259. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (protecting location records because they “hold for
many Americans the ‘privacies of life’”).
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information directly must be entitled to an expectation of privacy.
Consequently, the use of face identification at the border is a search
and thus implicates the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. That conclusion, however, does not determine what level
of protection the Fourth Amendment offers.
V. WHEN IS THE BORDER USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION
UNREASONABLE?
Any use of FRT that constitutes a search must ultimately be
reasonable to pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.260 In the border
context, this inquiry begins with a presumption in favor of the
government’s authority to use FRT without any individualized
suspicion.261 However, if its use becomes too intrusive on personal
privacy—determined relative to the sovereign’s security needs—then
it is a nonroutine search warranting additional Fourth Amendment
protection.262
A. Face Verification and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
The use of TVS for face verification, as explained above, is most
likely not a Fourth Amendment search. Therefore, TVS can be used
without implicating the Fourth Amendment at all.263 Further, even if it
were a search, it would most likely be a routine search that could be
conducted without any individualized suspicion.
Face verification falls within the scope of the border-search
exception since it substantially furthers the government’s interest in
determining a traveler’s admissibility. One of the core interests
underpinning the border-search doctrine is the need to prevent the
entry of “unwanted persons and effects.”264 An essential corollary to
that interest is “requiring one entering the country to identify himself
as entitled to come in.”265 This has traditionally been accomplished by
260. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (“The Fourth
Amendment commands that searches and seizures be reasonable.”).
261. Id. at 538.
262. See id. at 538, 541 (holding that the “detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the
scope of a routine customs search and inspection” requires reasonable suspicion).
263. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 211 (“[I]f something is not a ‘search’ . . . the Fourth
Amendment provides no protection at all.”).
264. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
265. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 (1977) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)).
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a border official physically inspecting a traveler’s documentation and
visually confirming they are the same person. The TVS can identify a
traveler more quickly and more accurately than a border official can.266
Additionally, face verification’s intrusion on individual privacy is
minimal. If the TVS is used for a one-to-one match, the information
used for verification is restricted to what is contained on a person’s
travel document. Even when the TVS accesses images in a comparison
database, the comparison is limited to images where the expectation of
privacy is minimal—such as other government-issued travel
documents. CBP’s image-retention policy also places strict time limits
on the retention of photos collected via the TVS.267 And again, even if
the use of face verification at the border was a search, it would be more
akin to a routine border search that could be performed without any
individualized suspicion.
B. Face Identification and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
The Fourth Amendment analysis for face identification—as
opposed to face verification—leads to a different conclusion. This
Section first analyzes the reasonableness of face identification,
concluding it is unreasonable outside of some individualized suspicion.
It then discusses what level of individualized suspicion is appropriate
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
1. Reasonableness Balancing for Face Identification. Suspicionless
face identification is unreasonable at the border when it reveals “the
privacies of life.” The issues associated with face identification parallel
those associated with electronic-device searches in at least two ways.
First, this use of FRT does not fit neatly within the scope of the bordersearch doctrine. Like the information gleaned from an electronicdevice search, the information revealed by a commercial FRS search,
such as travel habits, associations, or beliefs, may not directly

266. See TVS PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 42, at 3 (“[F]acial recognition has presented CBP
with the best biometric approach because it can be performed relatively quickly, with a high
degree of accuracy . . . .”); see also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Changing the Face of Travel 9–
10 (July 2018) (published online by the Electronic Privacy Information Center), https://epic.org/
foia/dhs/cbp/biometric-entry-exit-alt-screening-procedures/Changing-the-Face-of-Travel-PresoJuly2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RR7-LWXZ] (highlighting, inter alia, the faster boarding times
and up to 98.2 percent match rate associated with FRT).
267. See TVS PRIVACY IMPACT, supra note 42, at 8–9.
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determine a person’s admissibility.268 But the information displayed by
a commercial FRS can certainly be relevant in other ways to furthering
the government’s interests at the border.269 For example, if the student
in the hypothetical is admissible on a student visa, but surveillance
camera footage returned by an FRS suggests he never travels to the
school, that may be grounds for further questioning.270 Information
about one’s associations can, as demonstrated in the hypothetical, be
relevant to determining whether someone might be importing
contraband or whether they pose a national security threat.
Second, the intrusion on a traveler’s dignity and privacy interests
occasioned by face identification is, after Carpenter and Riley, too great
to be without some level of Fourth Amendment protection. Like
electronic devices, face identification can reveal information that
details the full scope of an individual’s private life. An investigating
border officer can submit someone’s image to a commercial FRS and—
long after a traveler has left the border—examine every aspect of that
person’s private life. Routine compliance with immigration and
customs law does not require that level of disclosure.271 This type of
face recognition thus resembles a nonroutine electronic-device search,
and its use should be considered unreasonable without some level of
individualized suspicion.
2. A Reasonable Suspicion Standard. Border officials should be
required to have reasonable suspicion to justify using face
identification, as opposed to face verification. Following the Fourth
Circuit’s approach, the standard for reasonable suspicion should be
that it must pertain to a crime that “bears some nexus to the border
search exception’s purposes of protecting national security, collecting
268. Admissibility is conditioned on having legal status to enter the country. Images from
CCTV and social media will not typically indicate whether someone is legally authorized to enter
the country.
269. See United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 2019) (suggesting that what
constitutes an evidentiary basis for a specific crime is relevant to individualized suspicion).
270. If someone is issued a student visa, one’s ability to work is often restricted, see generally
Students and Employment, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/workingunited-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/students-and-employment [https://perma.cc/YZ4CT8W4]. Violation of those rules can impact a student’s future ability to enter the United States.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(G) (2018) (stating that a student visa holder who “violates a term or
condition of such status” is inadmissible “until the alien has been outside the United States for a
continuous period of 5 years after the date of the violation”).
271. Cf. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 720–21 (treating a forensic device search as nonroutine based,
in part, on the privacy interests implicated by such devices).
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duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to
export or import contraband.”272 This limitation would keep the rule
tethered to the purposes underlying the border-search exception.
Requiring officers to establish reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing before they use FRT to conduct face identification should
be the constitutional floor at the border for several reasons. For one, it
is the only standard the Supreme Court and courts of appeals have
suggested would apply at the border for nonroutine searches.273 Plus,
no lower court that has decided this issue in the electronic-devicesearch context has required more than reasonable suspicion.274
Most importantly, it is arguably the standard that strikes the
appropriate balance between the government’s security prerogatives
and individual privacy interests at the border.275 Given the amount of
contraband entering the United States, and the creative tactics
employed by smugglers, a higher standard simply might not be
practical.276 In many cases, there may be enough facts for a border
official to have reasonable suspicion but not enough to establish
probable cause.277 And even if probable cause could accommodate the
needs of border officials, Riley and Carpenter both contemplate that

272. Id. at 721.
273. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540–41 (1985); cf. United
States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2018) (“For border searches both routine and
not, no case has required a warrant.”). The Supreme Court expressly rejected other amorphous
standards such as “clear indication” or “plain suggestion.” See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
at 536, 540–41 (“We do not think that the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis upon reasonableness is
consistent with the creation of a third verbal standard in addition to ‘reasonable suspicion’ and
‘probable cause’; we are dealing with a constitutional requirement of reasonableness, not mens
rea . . . .”).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed,
No. 20-1043 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2021) (reasonable suspicion applies); see also United States v. Wanjiku,
919 F.3d 472, 485 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[N]o circuit court, before or after Riley, has required more
than reasonable suspicion for a border search of cell phones or electronically-stored data.”).
275. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (“The ‘reasonable suspicion’
standard . . . effects a needed balance between private and public interests when law enforcement
officials must make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause.”).
276. See, e.g., id. at 541–43 (noting “alimentary canal smuggling at the border . . . gives no
external signs and inspectors will rarely possess probable cause to arrest or search”). For an
insight into the contraband seized at the border to date, see CBP Enforcement Statistics Fiscal
Year 2021, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. [hereinafter CBP 2021 Statistics], https://
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics [https://perma.cc/C7YB-Q65M].
277. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–43.
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different contexts might require different standards.278 Given that
probable cause has never been applied to searches at the border,279 it is
difficult to imagine a standard higher than reasonable suspicion
without direction from the Supreme Court.
To be sure, the reasonable suspicion standard is not without flaws.
Reasonable suspicion, some argue, does little to prevent “arbitrary,
discriminatory, and harassing searches,”280—especially considering the
judicial deference afforded to the training and experience of border
officials.281 Because the reasonable suspicion standard offers little
substantive protection, they argue only probable cause is appropriate
after Riley and Carpenter.282 However, courts routinely employ the
reasonable suspicion standard to suppress evidence and check
government overreach.283 This standard, while not perfect, offers a
baseline level of protection against completely suspicionless
searches.284 That is the “very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended
to stamp out.”285

278. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373, 401–02 (2014) (“[O]ther case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a
particular phone.”).
279. Probable cause has been applied to searches and seizures near the border. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–82 (1975) (holding that an officer on roving
patrol may question suspects about their citizenship status or any suspicious circumstance,
“but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause”). What
standard might apply in those contexts is beyond the scope of this Note.
280. E.g., Christopher I. Pryby, Note, Forensic Border Searches After Carpenter Require
Probable Cause and a Warrant, 118 MICH. L. REV. 507, 527 (2019).
281. See, e.g., Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Reasonable
suspicion is a relatively low standard and border officials are afforded deference due to their
training and experience.” (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542)).
282. E.g., Pryby, supra note 280, at 520–30 (“[T]he government must develop probable cause
and obtain a warrant before performing a forensic search of an electronic device at the border.”);
Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights, supra note 158, at 1014. One recent article questions
the historical assumptions underlying suspicionless searches of electronic devices, see generally
Note, The Border Search Muddle, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2278 (2019).
283. In the border context, courts have suppressed evidence discovered when officers had
little more than vague suspicions of wrongdoing. See, e.g., United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d
713, 723–24 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding reasonable suspicion did not exist simply because the agent
“had a concern” that an electronic device “might” contain child pornography); United States v.
Puga, No. 5:19-CR-1346-1, 2019 WL 7170623, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2019) (holding a 911 call
“that vaguely reported ‘suspicious’ behavior” does not amount to reasonable suspicion).
284. See, e.g., Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 723–24 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding reasonable suspicion did
not exist simply because the agent “had a concern” that an electronic device “might” contain child
pornography).
285. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 858 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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3. A Source Rule for Face Identification at the Border. The Riley
Court recognized the importance of fashioning legal doctrine that
“provide[s] clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical
rules.”286 The need for a categorical rule is especially important for the
use of face identification at the border. For some of the databases used
by border officials employing FRT, there might not be a reasonable
expectation of privacy at all. As the hypothetical demonstrates, there
may be a reasonable expectation of privacy over some sets of images
but not others. A subjective standard is superficially appealing: when
the government “learns something invasive, a search has occurred.”287
But an officer might not know whether a set of images is “invasive”
before conducting the search or until additional facts are known.288
Similarly, drawing a mosaic-theory line based on when the amount
of information collected becomes too intrusive is also unclear.289 The
number of photos displayed to an officer is tied to the amount
contained in the underlying database and the confidence interval set
by the officer.290 A face identification search could potentially return
hundreds of images from different sources. Is that unreasonable? What
if an FRS returned hundreds of photos, but only from a traveler’s
border crossings? And as the hypothetical demonstrated, an FRT
search might display only a small number of images that each directly
reveal private information. Would that search be unreasonable? Such
a line-drawing expedition will inevitably result in arbitrary decisions
about what constitutes a reasonable search.291

286. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 398 (2014).
287. KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 28).
288. Cf. Riley, 573 U.S. at 399 (declining to adopt a rule permitting an officer to search for
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest, officer safety, or an arrestee’s identity because it would
“impose few meaningful constraints on officers . . . and officers would not always be able to
discern in advance what information would be found where”). For a helpful illustration of this
issue, see KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 29–34).
289. The “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment posits that even if certain information,
on its own, is not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, the aggregation of such
information might trigger the Fourth Amendment. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory
of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (analyzing the implications of a mosaic
theory of the Fourth Amendment). In practice, this approach also poses difficult line-drawing
questions. See id. at 343–50 (describing the “mosaic theory” as a “vague middle ground”).
290. See, e.g., supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text; Satisky, supra note 245 (describing a
data set with “more than 2 million image frames of around 2,000 students from eight cameras
placed around [Duke’s] campus”).
291. Compare Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.3 (2018) (“It is sufficient for
our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment
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A bright-line standard, however, suffers from the risk of being
overinclusive. The reasonable suspicion standard would apply to an
entire database simply because it contains images that could reveal
“the privacies of life.”292 But the images returned for any one individual
might not actually reveal information that private. The reasonable
suspicion standard would apply even if a database contained no images
of a particular person. But as the Court stated in Arizona v. Hicks,293
“[a] search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable.”294
Though it is beyond the scope of this Note to suggest a full-fledged
doctrine, a per se rule based on whether the source database contains
any protected third-party information, such as the information in many
commercial FRSs, might be the most administrable standard.295 Under
this approach, border officials would have clear guidance. If officials
have reasonable suspicion of any crime related to the border
exception’s underlying purposes—such as drug trafficking—they could
use a commercial FRS without fear that any derivative evidence will be
tainted.296 Courts would not need to split hairs evaluating when the
information revealed became too intrusive. The court would need to
evaluate only the merits of the officer’s reasonable suspicion.297 Lastly,
travelers would have at least some assurance that border officers could
not peer into their private lives without a measure of suspicion giving
them a reason to do so.
In the end, classifying the use of facial identification at the border
as a nonroutine search is not a cure-all. In many cases, border officials
will satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard and gain a window into
search.”), with id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Why seven days instead of ten or three or
one?”).
292. See KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 40).
293. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
294. Id. at 325.
295. See KERR, Implementing Carpenter, supra note 111 (manuscript at 40–42) (“The most
administrable way to implement a test that treats digital surveillance as a search . . . is to treat the
fruits of digital surveillance as categorically different.”).
296. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963) (holding evidentiary fruits
of a Fourth Amendment violation are, generally, inadmissible as “fruit of the poisonous tree”).
Though this fear is likely diminished given the expansion of the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 725 (4th Cir. 2019)
(affirming the suppression motion’s denial based on the good-faith exception).
297. Compare United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 487–89 (7th Cir. 2019) (concluding
reasonable suspicion existed), with Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 723–24 (concluding officer lacked
reasonable suspicion).
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our lives. Albeit imperfect, the reasonable suspicion standard places at
least some obstacle in the way of a “too permeating police
surveillance” and safeguards “‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary
power.’”298 When applying “the blunt instrument of the Fourth
Amendment,” that sometimes is the best for which one can hope.299
CONCLUSION
Facial recognition technology is already being used to support
enforcement operations at the border.300 Considering the sheer amount
of contraband seized at the border, it is only a matter of time before a
scenario like the one described in this Note plays out in a federal
courthouse.301 When it does, federal courts should proceed carefully to
avoid “uncritically extend[ing] existing precedents,” which the Court
warned against in Carpenter and Riley.302 Unfortunately, the Fourth
Amendment claims calling for limits on FRT at the border will
probably only arise during suppression hearings involving “not very
nice people.”303 Given FRT’s obvious benefits, courts might be tempted
to shoehorn the use of FRT into the routine border-search doctrine.
But consider again the San Ysidro Port of Entry. The
overwhelming majority of the nearly one hundred thousand people
who enter this country are not importing contraband or otherwise
violating the law. Crossing the border, for many of them, is part of daily
life. They travel between San Diego and Tijuana to work, study, and
visit family. Countless others are merely passing through to pursue the
American Dream in places like Salinas, California; Amarillo, Texas;
and Nashville, Tennessee.304 Whatever their connection to the border,
each and every one of them is entitled to the Fourth Amendment’s
protection—regardless of the efficiency that modern technology offers.
After all, the border should be a gateway, not an “authoritarian twilight
zone.”305
298. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (emphasis added).
299. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part).
300. Emily Birnbaum, CBP Identifies over 100 ‘Imposters’ out of 19 Million with Face Scans at
Airports, Border, HILL (June 14, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/448643-cbpsays-it-has-caught-over-100-imposters-out-of-19-million-scanned-by [https://perma.cc/T4P4-DGJF].
301. In fiscal year 2020, CBP seized 533,708 pounds of illegal narcotics. See CBP 2021
Statistics, supra note 276.
302. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 386).
303. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
304. A journey familiar to this Author’s own parents.
305. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 564 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

